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Advice, authority and autonomy in Shared Decision Making in antenatal screening: the 
importance of context. 
 
Abstract 
Shared decision making has been widely advocated across many branches of healthcare, yet 
there is considerable debate over both its practical application and how it should be examined 
or assessed. More recent discussions of SDM have highlighted the important of context, both 
internal and external to the consultation, with a recognition that decisions cannot be 
understood in isolation. This paper uses conversation analysis (CA) to examine how decision 
making is enacted in the context of antenatal screening consultations in Hong Kong. Building 
on previous CA work (Collins et al 2005; Toerien et al 2013), we show that, whilst 
previously identified formats are used here to present the need for a decision, the overriding 
basis professionals suggest for actually making a decision in this context is the level of worry 
or concern a pregnant woman holds about potential fetal abnormality. Professionals take an 
unknowing ‘epistemic stance’ (Heritage 2012) towards this worry, and hence step back from 
involvement in decision making. We argue that this is linked to the non-directive ethos that 
prevails in antenatal screening services, and suggest that more research is needed to 
understand how the enactment of SDM is affected by wider professional contexts and 
parameters. 
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Background 
Shared decision making (SDM) has been widely advocated across many branches of 
healthcare. The rationales used to support SDM are equally wide- ranging, extending from 
the ethical (based on the notion of bodily integrity), through the philosophical (the principle 
of individual autonomy) to the practical (an assumption that compliance is more likely with a 
shared treatment decision) (Matthias et al. 2013). However, there is also considerable debate 
over the practical application of SDM, whether all settings are amenable to it, and whether 
decisions can be studied in isolation from the rest of the clinical encounter.  
 
A sizeable body of research has focused on identifying key concepts of SDM (e.g. Dy and 
Purnell 2012, Makoul and Clayman, 2006 ) Dy and Purnell (2012: 582) cite the following 
definition of SDM:   “A process by which a healthcare provider communicates to the patient 
personalised information about options, outcomes, probabilities and uncertainties of available 
options, and a patient communicates values and the importance of benefits and harms” 
(Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making 2006), and suggest that trustworthiness, 
information quality and communication are key components in achieving this end.  They 
conclude their study by suggesting that more work is needed on decision making style and 
the impact this has on SDM. Makoul and Clayman (2006) carried out a systematic review of 
418 articles on Shared Decision Making, selected through a PubMed search, to identify 
concepts commonly used in definitions of SDM. They found that no single concept was listed 
in all these articles, and that 20 concepts appeared in more than 10% of the papers reviewed. 
The most commonly occurring concepts were patient values/preferences, options, and 
partnership. However, the need to make (or to explicitly defer) a decision based on these 
values/preferences, and the available options, was also a recurring theme in this literature. 
 
The importance that has been placed on the making of a decision based on patient values and 
preferences has been reflected in the development of instruments explicitly designed to 
address the quality of shared decisions. Perhaps the two most prominent amongst these are 
provided by Braddock et al (1997) and Elwyn et al (2005). Braddock and colleagues 
developed their instrument through an initial synthesis by the authors of ethical models of 
informed consent in the bioethics literature. This led them to identify six key elements; the 
extent of discussion leading to each decision can then be graded according to the presence or 
absence of these six elements. Using this approach, an element is counted as present if 
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discussed at all, however briefly. However, as other authors have subsequently suggested, 
actions such as providing an alternative are not necessarily independent factors indicating 
whether a decision has been shared; for example a patient given clear alternatives can still be 
steered towards a practitioner’s preferred option (Brown et al 2004).  Elwyn et al’s OPTION 
scale embodies a slightly different approach to this issue, offering a ‘skills framework’ that is 
designed to represent a set of competences rather than a more discrete list of elements. In 
order to operationalise this skills framework, a 12 item scale is used, to which an overall 
numerical score can ultimately be assigned. As might be expected, this scale focuses both on 
how different options are presented to and explored with the patient, as well as establishing 
the level of involvement with decision making that the patient requires. 
 
It is clear then, that a focus on assessing the actual mechanics of decision making pervades 
the SDM literature. It is also the case that the issue of decision making is often 
conceptualised as having a straightforward relationship to treatment. However, the data set 
presented in this paper cannot be straightforwardly interrogated from this perspective. In an 
antenatal screening setting, what is at issue is not treatment, since no treatment can be offered 
during pregnancy for fetal abnormalities. Instead, when a pregnant woman receives the 
results of her screening tests, her available options are to do nothing, or to undergo further 
testing. This further testing, carried out by means of amniocentesis or chorionic villus 
sampling, will be diagnostic for some fetal abnormalities, but also carries with it a risk of 
miscarriage. In this setting, then, the relative importance of benefits and harms to a particular 
woman are key; whilst for some women any risk of miscarriage may to be too great to 
consider, for others, any risk of a child with Down’s syndrome is seen as unacceptable. What 
the difference between this setting and others more commonly studied from the perspective 
of SDM highlights, then, is the way in which context and decision making are intertwined. 
 
Matthias et al (2013) make the case for a consideration of context strongly in their 
discussion of SDM, though they also make a distinction between internal context, and 
external context or setting. In terms of the former, they highlight how previous studies of 
SDM have frequently focused only on the point where a decision is made in a 
consultation. They also note that scales designed to evaluate the nature and quality of 
shared decisions (e.g. Braddock et al (1997); Elwyn et al (2005) as described above) tend 
to focus only on portions of the consultation where decisions are discussed.  However, 
they argue that no part of an interaction can be fully understood in isolation, and that 
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what happens in the decision making process itself is inextricably linked to both what has 
happened before and what happens after. For example, if a clinician who has been very 
directive at the outset of a consultation later tries to involve a patient in a decision, the 
patient may be confused or reticent. They conclude by proposing an alternative model for 
examining SDM- the ‘Four Habits Approach’-, which focuses on investment in the 
beginning and end of the encounter as well as eliciting the patient’s perspective and 
demonstrating empathy. The aim is to provide a consistent internal context to support 
participation. 
 
This recognition of the importance of context, both internal and external, is also shared by 
other authors. Karnieli-Miller and Eisikovits’ (2009a) study, conducted in a clinic for 
adolescents with Inflammatory Bowel Disease, took a phenomenological approach to their 
data, aiming to explore how decisions were made in a real time context. They draw on 
observational, audio/video recorded, and interview data, to analyse consultations in which 
diagnoses are given and treatment decided. Their analysis identifies a number of persuasive 
strategies used by doctors to gain agreement to treatment decisions; such strategies are at 
odds with usual definitions of a SDM approach, but the authors caution that the specific 
external context here, and in particular the nature of the patient group, limits generalizability. 
In a subsequent response to a critique of their paper (Karnieli-Miller and Eisikovits 2009b: 
13), they conclude that “only by looking at the context, which includes the dynamics during 
the entire encounter, the way treatment is presented and the opportunity to negotiate, 
deliberate and share the decision, can one assess whether the decision was shared or not”. 
 
Other researchers investigating SDM have come to similar conclusions about the importance 
of context, but addressed these in a different way. Collins et al (2005) argue that conversation 
analysis (CA) is an ideal method for research in this field, because of its rejection of a priori 
models, whether these seek to take account of internal context or not. As they highlight, CA 
studies are not based on preconceptions of what patient participation ought to look like, and 
so rather than seeking to identify the presence or absence of existing key concepts or 
elements, they focus instead on how decision making is enacted, and how the interactional 
configuration shapes opportunities for patient involvement. Toerien et al (2013: 873), in their 
paper using conversation analysis to investigate decision making in neurology consultations, 
conclude that “Future CA studies should map out the range of ways …in which … decision-
making is initiated by clinicians”, arguing that this is necessary to produce evidence-based 
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contributions to the debate on shared decision making. This paper aims to contribute to such 
an endeavour. 
 
Methods 
This paper arises from a study of antenatal screening provision in Hong Kong (see also 
Pilnick and Zayts 2012; Pilnick and Zayts 2014). The overall data set currently comprises 
over 120 video recorded consultations. This paper draws on a subset of these data: 28 women 
who receive ‘high risk’ results from initial screening (in this setting a result of greater than 1 
in 250 for women undergoing a combined test, and greater than 1 in 320 for an integrated test 
which assesses additional screening markers
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).As described in Pilnick and Zayts (2012), 
these women receive a telephone call asking them to return to the clinic and discuss their 
results; though the actual results are not given over the telephone, they can therefore infer that 
they fall into the ‘high risk’ category before they arrive at the clinic. During their consultation 
at the clinic, the actual results are given, and the available options for further invasive, 
diagnostic testing (amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling) are discussed. On average, 
these consultations are approximately 15 minutes in length. Consultations in this setting are 
routinely scheduled 15 minutes apart, since providing antenatal screening services is only one 
aspect of obstetric provision the staff conducting the consultations are involved in. Ethics 
Committee approval was obtained from both the University of Hong Kong and a Hospital 
Authority cluster overseeing the hospital where the data were collected.  The recruitment 
procedure involved a study nurse approaching potential participants and introducing the 
research project to them before seeking consent to participate. The background of the 
recruited participants reflects the diversity of the client population at this particular hospital, 
which although it is a public hospital, is also used by those who would generally choose 
private healthcare because of its status and facilities as part of a Hong Kong University. 
Women in our sample originate from various parts of Asia (Hong Kong, Mainland China, 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia), North and South America, Europe, New Zealand and 
Australia.  Their socioeconomic background also ranges widely, from women employed as 
domestic workers to those in professional occupations.   The age of the participants is from 
35 to 41 years old.  
 
Consultations were conducted by 4 medical professionals (3 doctors and 1 specialist nurse), 
all of whom are Hong Kong Chinese. The consultations chosen for presentation here are all 
conducted by doctors, marked as ‘D’ in the transcripts. Some women attended clinic alone, 
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whilst others attended with a partner or significant other; in the transcripts that follow 
pregnant women and their partners/significant others are referred to as P and S respectively).  
In the consultations either English or Cantonese are used as the first or the second language 
of the participants. The consultations conducted in Cantonese were initially transcribed and 
then translated into English. As we have described previously (Pilnick and Zayts 2012), we 
are aware of the social, cultural and political challenges involved in any act of transcribing, 
and particularly so in transcribing translated data (Bucholtz, 2007).  We have therefore paid 
particular attention to ‘validating’ (Peräkylä, 2004) the translations of the transcripts. More 
specifically, the initial transcriptions and translations were carried out by two bilingual 
research assistants. Both the transcripts and their translation were verified by a bilingual 
member of the research team. We have also followed the procedures for validation as 
suggested by Peräkylä (2004:216) in that we have paid particular attention to “the next 
speaker’s interpretation of the preceding action” in our analysis. In conducting our analysis, 
we have used 4 line transcripts where consultations were conducted in Cantonese. These 
present firstly the Cantonese characters, followed by a pinyin representation which represents 
the phonetic sounds of the Cantonese speech in the Roman alphabet. The third line is a literal 
translation from the Cantonese, and the fourth and final line is a representation which makes 
sense in spoken English. As far as was possible, given the grammatical differences between 
the two languages, features of speech such as ‘stretching’ of sounds, emphasis, and pauses 
have been retained in this final translation. However, in some cases, where particles of speech 
are not directly translatable, such features have been lost. For reasons of space in this paper, 
where data have been translated into English, we have presented only the final translation 
here. However, the original transcripts and translations are available on the journal website 
(insert address).  
 
 The analysis was conducted using conversation analysis, and extracts reproduced here 
employ standard CA transcription notation (ten Have, 2007; Jefferson, as published in 
Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). Using conversation analysis, we examine these consultations to 
show how decisions are made in this context. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis presented here begins with a consideration of the ways in which professionals in 
this setting present the need for a decision to be made regarding future action and the options 
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that are available. There are a variety of decision-making formats which have been previously 
described in the literature, and which can also be found in this setting; however, as we will 
demonstrate, the context of the antenatal screening clinic appears to impact on the relative 
frequency with which these occur, and also give rise to some context-specific features. In 
later sections of this paper, we will turn to consider the basis on which professionals suggest 
a decision about future action should be made. For the present, we begin with the distinction 
that has previously been made between ‘unilateral’ and bilateral’ presentations of decision 
making. 
  
i) Unilateral approaches to decision making 
In their analysis of decision making in ENT and oncology clinics, Collins et al (2005) break 
the process down into a number of analytic phases. They characterise these as follows: firstly 
the ‘opening of the decision-making sequence’ sets the scene for presenting and 
characterising a problem; subsequently  the ‘presentation and evaluation of the test result or 
diagnosis’ provides various opportunities and avenues for talking about and reflecting on the 
problem. The ‘introduction of the decision point’ is where a decision is initially referenced. 
This is followed by ‘consideration and discussion of options’ in which one or more options 
are identified and debated. Finally, the ‘conclusion of the decision-making phase’ presents 
the chosen course of action (which in their data may be a treatment selection, or may be an 
agreement to continue discussion on another occasion). Following this, transition to another 
consultation phase begins. Collins et al draw a distinction between ‘unilateral’ approaches, 
where the doctor more or less autonomously conducts the decision making process through 
these phases, and ‘bilateral’ approaches, where patient views are solicited and there is what 
they describe as ‘a sharpening of focus’ through the answers provided by the patient.  
 
Such unilateral, doctor led approaches are occasionally found in our data. In 2 out of 28 cases 
collected and analysed so far in our subset, doctors present a decision (in both instances using 
the imperative form ‘we need’) to suggest that further testing ought to take place. In one 
instance this relates to amniocentesis, and the ‘need’ for the test is presented in unmitigated 
fashion and without discussion (see Pilnick and Zayts 2012 for a more detailed consideration 
of this consultation). In the instance reproduced below it relates to a further ultrasound scan. 
In the consultation from which the extract below is taken, the pregnant woman has just 
received the results of her screening test, which have shown a low risk for Down’s syndrome 
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but a raised risk for a different chromosomal abnormality, Edwards’ syndrome2. The three 
participants are the doctor (D), pregnant woman (P) and her husband (S). 
 
Extract 1 [FYMC] 
 
Context: The woman is 37 years old; after the initial screening her risk of having a child with 
Edward’s syndrome has been estimated as 1:40 (the risk of Down’s syndrome is 1:460). This is the 
woman’s third pregnancy, she has two healthy children. The woman attends the consultation with her 
husband. All participants are Hong Kong Chinese, and the consultation is conducted in Cantonese 
(participants’ native language). 
 
21. D: But, we say the chance is one in forty. (0.3) For: this, I think:, we for the time 
22.   being <say: then:: (.) also::> (0.6) .hh em::: (0.4) >I think< we need to have an 
23.   ultrasound. 
24.   (0.4) 
25. P: Mm[mm ] 
26. D:       [>some]times:< (.) after we: (0.2) have seen it, .hh (0.4) >because the 
27.   ultrasound:<, (.) >because< (0.3) this condition, compared (.) with Down 
28.   syndrome, is very different. .h 
29. S: Mm hmm. 
30. D: Because, the ultrasound can clearly show problems on the structure. 
31.   (0.2) 
32. S: Okay 
33. D: So (.) if we have seen it and then discuss it further, it will be better. 
34. P: [Mm hmm.] ((while nodding)) 
35. S: [Mm hmm.] ((while nodding)) 
 
Here, then, the result of the test is presented with use of the institutional ‘we’ (‘we say the 
chance is one in forty’, line 21), which locates the finding within a wider framework of 
medical expertise. This use of ‘we’ is continued into the doctor’s next utterance (lines 21-23), 
but this time the ‘we’ presumably also incorporates the pregnant woman, since she is the 
person who will actually ‘have’ the ultrasound. The imperative character of the proposal (‘we 
need to have’) is softened here by the use of the mitigator ‘I think’, and also by invoking 
temporal factors (that this is a proposal ‘for the time being’, thereby implying that subsequent 
decisions remain open to discussion). Although the word ‘also’ is used in this formulation 
(line 22), the proposal for ultrasound does not appear to be ancillary to any other proposed 
new action here, and no additional proposal for a new action is made during this consultation; 
it may refer instead to the ultrasound as an addition to the test that has already taken place. 
After a short pause, there is a very minimal and soft acknowledgment made by the pregnant 
woman, before the doctor continues with a rationale for this decision (lines 26-28), which 
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may be aimed at eliciting a more overt measure of agreement by the woman. As conversation 
analytic work on advice giving in a variety of health care settings (e.g. Heritage and Sefi 
1992; Pilnick 1999; Koenig 2011) has repeatedly demonstrated, an utterance which promotes 
or forwards a future course of action for a patient is treated as requiring a response. In 
addition, and more specifically, Stivers (2006) shows how doctors routinely pursue responses 
to treatment recommendations when these are not initially forthcoming from patients. 
Minimal receipts or silence may be treated as passive resistance to a course of action, 
therefore doctors may do more work to justify this and to elicit a more extended response. As 
Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2012) highlight, because treatment decisions concern patients’ 
future actions, a patient is required to demonstrate that s/he assumes some responsibility in 
this regard. This time it is the husband who provides a minimal acknowledgment to the 
doctor’s proposal, in line 29; this minimal acknowledgement produces a further account for 
the proposed procedure from the doctor (line 30), before the husband produces an ‘okay’ in 
line 32. In response to this the doctor provides a third account for the proposal, which is 
presented in a depersonalized format (‘it will be better’). This version of the account suggests 
that an ultrasound scan is a desirable precursor for any further discussion about future action, 
and in response both the woman and her partner signal agreement both verbally and non-
verbally. 
 
This decision then, is produced as a (strongly advocated) proposal by the doctor, for which 
assent is sought, in the absence of any solicitation of the pregnant woman’s views. Despite 
this, the active pursual of an agreement suggests that the doctor does not treat her own 
utterance as merely informational. However, as Toerien et al (2013:886) note, presentation of 
only one treatment option can create a scenario which does not give patients much ‘room for 
manoeuvre’, and only a single option is on the table here, though various different rationales 
are used to justify it. Whilst further work by Reuber, Toerien et al (forthcoming) shows that 
single options can be delivered in ways that give the patient a choice, any choice in Extract 1 
above is backgrounded by the doctor’s delivery. 
 
Collins et al (2005) suggest that unilateral decision making is characterised by the emphatic 
presentation of test results or diagnosis, pointing to the necessity of doing something and 
perhaps of acting quickly, and omitting consideration of the option of doing nothing. The 
option of ‘doing nothing’ is a particularly salient one in this setting; given that there is no 
treatment for any of the conditions that can be identified here, it is an ever-present option for 
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women to set against the possibility of further invasive testing and/or termination of 
pregnancy. However, this option may be made more or less visible in these consultations, and 
its visibility is minimised in the extract above; it is the doctor who knows what ought to be 
done and assent is then sought for her proposal.  
 
Recent work in conversation analysis has focused on the area of epistemics in interaction: 
examining how claims to knowledge are produced, understood and contested through talk 
(Heritage and Raymond 2005; Heritage 2012). This literature makes distinctions between 
epistemic status (who has access (or primary access) to an element of knowledge) and 
epistemic stance, which encompasses the position that a participant takes vis-a-vis another 
participant’s knowledge. For example, a question may convey an unknowing epistemic 
stance, regardless of whether some part of the answer is known or suspected by the asker 
(Heritage 2012). A third element to such analyses is epistemic authority: whether participants 
have the right (or primary right) to particular elements of knowledge. For example, as 
Heritage (2012) describes, and except in the special case of psychotherapy, participants are 
generally seen as having both primary knowledge of and primary rights over their own 
internal feeling states. 
 
Relating this work to the topic under investigation here, one way to conceptualise the 
exchange in Extract 1 is that the doctor in this instance claims not only epistemic authority, 
but also ‘deontic authority’ (Stevanovic and Peräkylä 2012): the right to determine another’s 
future actions.  Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2012: 298) make a distinction between epistemic 
authority and deontic authority as follows: “epistemic authority is about knowing how the 
world “is”; deontic authority is about determining how the world “ought to be””. It follows 
from this that to a first speaker’s suggestion, a second speaker can acquiesce to or resist plans, 
but also acquiesce to or resist the speaker’s right to make them. In this instance the pregnant 
woman and her partner produce neither kind of resistance, the ‘needed’ ultrasound proposed 
by the doctor is arranged, and her deontic authority remains unchallenged.  
 
ii) Non-unilateral approaches to decision making 
a) Recommendations 
As we have noted, these unilateral presentations, where alternatives are not presented and 
women’s viewpoints are not explicitly solicited, are rare in our data. The remainder of our 
consultations contain presentations that, on this basis, might appear to fall into Collins et al’s 
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(2005) bilateral categorisation. However, we will return to the issue of whether some of the 
approaches seen in our data can truly be categorised as bilateral, in the sense that this term 
has been previously used, below. Once again, existing literature has shed light on some of the 
interactional mechanisms through which such non-unilateral decisions can be presented. In 
their paper examining decision making in neurology from a CA perspective, Toerien et al 
(2013) identify two types of practice that are commonly used in that setting: recommending a 
particular course of action; and ‘option listing’, entailing the construction of a list of possible 
options from which patients must actively choose. In recommending, they suggest that a 
professional claims to know both what can be done and what the patient should do, so that 
they claim not only medical knowledge but also the right to advise the patient. Knowledge, 
and the issue of who has access to this knowledge, is thus key in this setting; the professional 
and patient have unequal epistemic access to the domain of treatment information. In three of 
our 28 cases, practitioners do provide alternatives, but accompany these with a 
recommendation as to which should be chosen. Extract 2 shows an example of a 
recommendation from our data. 
 
 
Extract 2 [JTJ] 
 
Context: The woman is 36 years old, this is her fifth pregnancy. After the initial screening her risk 
factor for Down Syndrome has been estimated at 1:170; and for Edwards Syndrome at 1: 30. The 
woman is attending the consultation together with her husband. The consultation is conducted in 
English.  
 
14. D:  Our cut off is (.) uh one out of (.) uh two hundred fifty. 
15. S:    [Right.] 
16. P:    [Yeh.] 
17. D:    Um (.) above that cut off, we will suggest that, em you have an 
18.   amniocentesis, to find out if the baby really have Downs. Okay?  
19.   .h It- it is our recommendation, but it’s really up to [you] 
20. P:                                                                                           [Um huh] 
21. D: whether (0.5) .h you <would (.) [want] to>= 
22. S:          [Sure.] 
23. P:  =Um huh. 
24. D: Go further on for a test. Okay? (.) .hh um: (0.5) the (0.3) mainly, I think it is the 
25.    uh, (0.3) the pregnancy uh associated uh protein (0.2) um .hh which is: 
26.    lower than average. 
27. S: Yeh  
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In this extract, at line 17 there is a suggestion (again made using the institutional ‘we’) that 
those people who find themselves in the class ‘above the cut off’ should have amniocentesis 
(c.f. Silverman 2007). However, there is no immediate uptake of this suggestion following 
the pursuing ‘Okay?’ in line 18, and in line 19 this is reformulated as a recommendation. 
However, the fact that this is something to be actively accepted or rejected by the couple is 
explicitly signalled, and the agency of the couple is explicitly invoked in deciding what 
should happen next. This agency is accepted by the husband in his overlap of ‘sure’ in line 
22, which acts as an agreement that this is ‘up to them’. Here, then, whilst the doctor asserts 
epistemic authority in relation to the status of the test results and what they should be taken to 
mean, deontic authority- the right to determine another’s actions- is not claimed. 
Recommendations may, of course, be produced more or less directively by professionals (and 
at the extreme end of this spectrum it may be argued that they are not really ‘bilateral’ 
approaches at all), but in the context of our data they are always accompanied by an active 
solicitation of views from pregnant women. This kind of presentation foregrounds the issue 
of choice. It is also notable that the doctor in this case makes considerable efforts to 
demonstrate the basis for the epistemic authority on which her recommendations are based. In 
this case she does so through a focus on a particular component of this specific result 
(‘pregnancy associated protein’ in lines 24-26);  in other examples doctors draw on their 
knowledge of population level statistics
3
.  
 
 
ii) Option listing 
 
As we noted earlier, Toerien et al (2013) identified a second practice in their neurology data: 
option listing. They argue that when clinicians use option listing, they work to relinquish a 
little of their authority. This is because option listing claims only knowledge of which options 
are available, and not which ones patient should take. They also suggest that option listing not 
only encourages active patient participation but makes it relevant in order for the interaction 
to proceed, since it “creates a slot where the patient’s announcement of their selection from 
the list is relevantly due” (p881). Such option listing occurred frequently in our data (12 out of 
28 cases) and Extract 3 below shows an example. 
 
Extract 3 [LTMA] 
 
13 
 
Context: The woman is 37 years old, after the initial screening her risk has been estimated as 1: 244. 
This is the woman’s first pregnancy. She is attending the consultation together with her husband. All 
participants in this interaction are Hong Kong Chinese, and the consultation is conducted in 
Cantonese. 
 
52. D: .h so but based on this, (0.4) the cut off, (0.2) is set like that, .h this 
53.   (0.2) .h is the cut off, which (0.3) means (0.5) <the report is positive.> 
54. P: Um. 
55.   (0.4) 
56. D: It depends on whether you and your husband::: (.) are (0.3) worried, (0.4) 
57.   and want to go for amniocentesis. Or (.) we can have an ultrasound, to see 
58.   if roughly (0.9) eh::: we don’t see anything special, 
59. P: Um. 
 
 
In this extract, again the results from the screening tests are presented as the driver for a 
decision (lines 52-53). Interestingly, only two of the three possible options in this scenario are 
explicitly presented- amniocentesis and further ultrasound (lines 57-8) - while the third, to 
take no action, is left unsaid (though perhaps could be heard implicitly). However, what is 
more significant for the analysis presented here is the basis on which the practitioner in this 
instance suggests the decision should be made between these options- whether the woman and 
her partner are ‘worried’ (line 56). We will return to analysis of this consultation, as it 
continues to unfold, later in this paper, but for now we will focus on the work that is done 
here by invoking worry as a factor in decision making. 
 
 
As we have previously noted, Heritage (2012) makes the distinction between epistemic 
authority and epistemic status, where the latter is not just about the possession of information 
but also incorporates rights to articulate this. In these terms, thoughts, feelings and hopes are 
generally treated as a person’s to know and describe. ‘Worry’ is a subjective feeling, and 
accordingly it is treated by the doctor in this extract as known by the pregnant woman, but not 
by her; she takes an ‘unknowing’ epistemic stance towards this worry. Toerien and colleagues 
(2013) have described how option listing in their study setting worked to relinquish medical 
authority and invoke patient participation. However, we would argue that what happens in this 
extract, and this context, goes considerably further than that. The implication of the doctor’s 
epistemic stance in this consultation is that a decision on which option is preferable here is not 
one to be taken on the basis of medical meaning making or medical recommendation, but on 
how the woman feels. Whilst this may seem a pragmatic approach to dealing with the issues 
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at hand, it also has huge implications for shared decision making. If it is suggested that a 
medical decision should be made on the basis of an internal feeling state to which a 
practitioner has no direct access, it follows that the decision is treated neither as one that the 
doctor has rights over, nor as one that can be ‘shared’, but instead one that the woman alone 
can make. To return to Collins’ et al’s characterisation, whilst the presentation of the decision 
may show features of a bilateral approach,  we would argue that it cannot be truly described 
as bilateral because the doctor places the end decision firmly in the woman’s domain and 
steps away from any involvement. However, neither is it unilateral in the sense previously 
described in the literature, where it has been assumed that doctors or other professionals are 
the agents of unilateral decisions. In the final analytic section of this paper, we will turn to 
consider this finding in more detail, alongside its implications. 
 
iii) ‘Worry’ as a determinant of choice 
 
In our data from this project, whenever an ‘option listing’ approach to decision making is 
used, it is always combined with a reference to worry (or less commonly, ‘concern’) as the 
factor on which choice between the options should depend. Extract 4 is a further example of 
this: 
 
 
Extract 4 [TYY] 
 
Context: The patient is 36 years old and Hong Kong Chinese. She has taken an integrated test1, and 
her risk factor has been estimated at 1:295 (the cut-off value for the integrated test is 1:320). This is 
the woman’s third pregnancy; she is attending the consultation on her own and it is conducted in 
Cantonese. 
 
35. D: ok, actually, (.) we can say the- the chance of the baby having Down 
36.   syndrome is high, or low, (0.4) .h here we say, the chance is one out of three 
37.   hundred and twenty, (0.3) so this is (0.4) .h that is a bit higher, so we also: 
38.   (.) assume it’s high, so we call you to come back to explain it further. 
39. P: Alright. 
40. D: It doesn’t mean that the baby (0.6) must have Down. (.) It (0.4) depends: on 
41.   how much you worry about it. (0.6) and (0.9) whether you want to have 
42.   further investigation to confirm this result. (0.6) If you don’t worry about it, 
43.   then you can:, (0.5) that is to have further check after the baby is born. (1.0) 
44.   But if you really want to know, (.) that is before the baby is born you want 
45.   to know the result, (0.3) .h then you need to (0.8) that is to do the 
46.   amniocentesis. 
47. P: Um:. 
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In this extract, the test results are first presented as a rationale for having asked the woman to 
reattend the clinic, and following an acknowledgment of these in line 39, the doctor states 
what they do not mean, i.e. that they are not definitive (see Pilnick and Zayts 2014 for a 
detailed discussion of how uncertainty of results is managed in this setting). Once again in 
this consultation, as in the consultation from which Extract 3 is taken, what should happen 
next is presented as contingent upon the level of worry that the woman holds (‘It (0.4) 
depends on how much you worry about it’ in lines 40-41), before the two options- of doing 
nothing at present, or of having amniocentesis, are presented. This time, each of these options 
is tied to a particular hypothetical epistemic (and emotional) position for the woman; if she is 
not worried about not knowing, then she can wait to obtain further knowledge, but if she 
needs to know a certain outcome now, she should take the amniocentesis. Once again here, 
the doctor does not claim the right to advise or know what to do in this particular situation- 
which might be seen as adhering to key principles of SDM- but what is significant in this 
setting is that the means for making a decision is placed firmly outside the domain of medical 
knowledge or expertise.   
 
We have previously highlighted Heritage’s (2012) assertion that it is generally the case that 
persons are treated as having primary access to, and authority over, their own feeling states. In 
line with his research, we do not find it surprising that doctors should take an ‘unknowing’ 
epistemic stance towards the levels of worry that women hold in this context. However, as we 
have also noted, the consequence of this is that decisions which invoke worry as the means of 
choosing between options are not presented or treated as something to be shared, or as a 
situation in which medical expertise can assist with choice. We began this paper by making a 
case for the importance of context in studies of Shared Decision Making, and it is worth 
considering here for a moment the specific context in which these interactions occur. 
Antenatal screening is a particularly sensitive setting for decision making, since most 
anomalies that are detected cannot be treated or cured. Termination of pregnancy is therefore 
a potential end consequence of screening and testing decisions. As a result, antenatal 
screening settings have received a considerable amount of sociological attention, with some 
commentators arguing that the way in which the service is provided amounts to a form of 
‘weak eugenics’ (Shakespeare 1998). In response to these charges, the concept of non-
directive practice has been widely adopted, though a number of critics have suggested that 
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while it may be a philosophical ideal, it is ultimately interactionally unworkable  (e.g. 
Anderson, 1999; Brunger and Lippman, 1995; Gervais, 1993; Rentmeester, 2001). However, 
as previous studies have demonstrated, a common interactional manifestation of practice that 
is designed to be non-directive is an unwillingness by practitioners to give specific advice 
(e.g. Zayts and Schnurr, 2012). It is possible, then, that the recourse to ‘worry’ as the arbiter 
of choice which recurs in our data is so common precisely because it works as a way of 
managing this ideal of non-directiveness. In a situation where a decision is framed as 
dependent on the level of worry a pregnant woman has, a professional cannot advise on the 
best course of action because they cannot know what it is. 
  
Thus far, we have suggested that the common practice in these consultations of invoking 
worry as a feeling state over which pregnant women have epistemic primacy is in line with 
what would be expected from previous literature. We have also suggested that such 
invocations may work as a way of managing non-directiveness, since if a doctor does not 
know the level of worry a pregnant woman holds, he or she cannot make further suggestions 
on how a decision should be made between the available options, or give advice on which 
should be chosen. However, what is also notable on analysis of these consultations is that the 
worry that is invoked is not treated as a topic for articulation by the pregnant woman, or for 
further discussion. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that commonly used 
definitions of Shared Decision Making stress the importance of exploring the relative 
importance of the benefits and harms of particular courses of action for patients (e.g. Dy and 
Purnell 2012). In none of the consultations in our corpus do professionals actively seek any 
further information about whether women are worried, the level of worry they hold, or what 
their worries may specifically be about. Despite this lack of direct solicitation, we do have 
cases in our corpus where women themselves attempt to share their worry. Extract 5 below is 
a continuation of the consultation from which Extract 3 above is taken (in the intervening 10 
lines the doctor has placed an accuracy figure on the results of a further ultrasound scan as 40-
50%, emphasising that this will not give a definitive answer). In this continuation, following 
the doctor’s previous making relevant the issue of worry, the pregnant woman explicates her 
specific worry as being tied to the consequences of further invasive testing. 
 
Extract 5 [LTMA] 
 
70. P: But if actually I- I am worried, (.) if I have amniocentesis, (0.4) .h what the 
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71. consequence will be, because I heard that, out of two hundred, there is (0.4) 
72. one miscarriage. 
73.   (0.2) 
74. D: Yes. (0.4) ((while nodding)) Because having amniocentesis (0.3) <is::: (0.6) 
75.   that <people are (.) worried: about the chance of miscarriage.> 
76.   (0.2) 
77. P: Um hmm. 
78. D: That is the chance of miscarriage (0.5) .hh is one in two hundred to one 
79.   hundred. 
80.   (1.6) 
81. P: Two hundred to one hundred? 
82. D: Yes. 
83. P: huh huh ((nasal laugh)) ((looks at S)) 
84. D:  hh ((nasal laugh)) 
 
 
Over lines 70-72, the woman here articulates a very specific worry: the risk of miscarriage 
following amniocentesis. She formulates her knowledge about this risk as a proposal to be 
confirmed, and the doctor subsequently provides this confirmation in line 74. The doctor then 
continues to expand on the actual risk figure over her following turn, finally arriving in lines 
78-79 at a range formulation which has the woman’s original proposal as its lower limit but 
indicates the possibility may also be higher. Her response, then, attends to the medical 
verification of the woman’s statistical understanding, but does not extend to any further 
unpacking of the worry around this. Following wry laughter from the woman, with which the 
doctor joins in, the topic is temporarily concluded and a discussion of timescales and the 
procedure for arranging subsequent testing should it be required (not shown here) ensues. The 
consultation then continues as in Extract 6 below.  
 
Ex 6 [LTMA contd] 
110. P: Do you have anything to ask? ((talking to S and clearing her throat)) 
111.   (2.6) 
112. P: Actually I am worried, that is after having amniocentesis, (0.8) what it may 
113.   lead: to (0.4) what it will become, because= 
114. D: =Um. 
115. P: Because overall it’s our first baby, and my age is high. 
116. D: Right. ((while turning over and reading the report)) 
117.   (1.2) 
118. D: You didn’t have bleeding recently? 
119.   ((P shakes her head)) 
120.   (2.2) 
121. D: Ok, so: 
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In line 110, the pregnant woman turns to her husband and softly asks if he has any questions. 
After a pause, it is actually the pregnant woman herself who speaks again, returning to the 
issue of her specific worry. Again, the issue of miscarriage following amniocentesis is 
referred to (lines 112-13), though this time in a much less direct format that leaves the 
consequence of miscarriage implicit rather than explicitly named. Following a minimal 
response from the doctor in line 114, the woman goes on to contextualise her worry even 
further: this is a first baby, and her age means it may not be easy to become pregnant again. 
Her own knowledge of her feeling state, then, is both shared with and explicated for the 
doctor. However, once given access to this feeling state, the doctor does not directly respond 
to it, or use it to help contextualise a decision. Instead, her subsequent question in line 118 
(‘you didn’t have any bleeding recently’) seems designed to establish whether there are any 
additional risk factors for miscarriage; notably this question is designed to project a negative, 
‘no problem’ response (Raymond 2003, Boyd and Heritage 2006). Ultimately, even though 
the pregnant woman shares both the nature of her worry and the reasons for her feelings, the 
doctor does not pursue this in the context of decision making. 
 
Rapley (2008a) has persuasively argued in this journal that research on decision making in 
healthcare has neglected the ways that individuals’ decisions are shaped over time by 
knowledge and encounters beyond the immediate space of a single consultation. We share his 
call for an understanding which is better contextualised. However, in our setting, it appears 
that decisions are not simply shaped beyond the consultation, they are actively pushed 
beyond it by the emphasis that is placed here on subjective feeling states. 
 
In a context where non-directive practice is held as an ideal, it is easy to see why 
professionals do not generally assume deontic rights over decision making. However, the 
issue of epistemic rights is more complex. Whilst nurses and doctors may not have epistemic 
rights regarding feeling states, and hence the ultimate decision to take a test or not, they still 
have greater epistemic resources regarding outcomes of antenatal screening in general, based 
on their experience and training. Such epistemic resources are commonly shared in the 
delivery of results, in order to help women understand what different risk figures should be 
taken to mean, and where contextualisations such as ‘not so high’ are commonplace. 
However, in relation to the issue of worry, any contextualisation appears to be much more 
limited (as in the repeat of official statistics for the risk associated with amniocentesis cited in 
Extract 5 above). The end consequence is that where, following the process of option listing, 
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women seek help in working out which is the best option for them, such help is not 
forthcoming
4
. 
 
Conclusions 
Our analysis has shown how data from this setting exhibit features that have previously been 
identified by those who have studied decision making in healthcare contexts. However, 
previously identified formats also map imperfectly on to these data. Though it is a rare 
occurrence, doctors do on occasion assume the deontic authority to tell people what to do. 
This is seen in the unilateral delivery of Extract 1. Since we have only two cases of this kind 
in the current corpus, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to why this might occur. 
As we have previously noted (Pilnick and Zayts 2014), there is no straightforward correlation 
in our data between the level of risk a test result shows and the extent to which future courses 
of action are more or less assertively promoted by professionals. However, we note the 
minimal responses of the pregnant women and their spouses in these scenarios, and we also 
note that we have no examples of this unilateral delivery of a decision, or the associated 
assumption about the right to assume deontic authority, being resisted. This is not to say that 
the women in these cases are victims: as Costello and Roberts (2001:242) argue “Patients 
both accept and resist recommendations; they do not simply fall victim to physicians’ 
preferences”. These examples demonstrate that when doctors do make unilateral decisions in 
an antenatal screening context, they are treated as having rights to do so. Our analysis here, 
then, responds to Stevanovic and Peräkylä’s (2012: 318) call for “comparative research on 
participants’ orientations to deontic authority in different institutional and everyday 
environments”.  
 
Our analysis has also shown that in this context, professionals sometimes make 
recommendations. The three examples of this in our data set vary in the way in which these 
are presented, but they have in common a solicitation of views from pregnant women and 
their partners; so whilst professionals in these consultations assume the right to advise, they 
do not assume the right to decide. More commonly in our data set, professionals option list, 
but we have identified an important difference between the work of Toerien et al (2013) and 
the data we present here. In contrast to studies of treatment decision making in other contexts, 
in the antenatal screening context the basis for the decision is commonly suggested to be not 
the specific level of risk the test result suggests, but rather ‘feelings’ about this result. Despite 
their medical knowledge and status, professionals frame the decision to be made in terms of 
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worry and concern, with the result that the decision is cast as a matter in which only pregnant 
women and their partners have expertise. Such a presentation undermines the ‘bilateral’ 
nature of the consultation (Collins et al 2005) which has initially been constructed, and 
suggests that the distinction between unilateral and bilateral decision making is less 
straightforward than has previously been assumed. In particular, the assumption that the 
professional is always the agent of unilateral decision making does not hold in this setting. 
Whilst the presence or absence of the worry felt by pregnant women is topicalised, since it is 
not further explored by professionals, the decision cannot be shared. Even where women 
themselves express clear worry or actively seek to share this worry and so level the ‘epistemic 
gradient’ (Heritage 2010), no input into their decision is forthcoming. Hence, one of the 
tentative conclusions to be drawn here is paradoxical: that women who do not ask for input 
may have their choices determined, but women who actively seek guidance do not receive it. 
We argue that this particular operationalization of SDM in practice is tied to a context in 
which non-directiveness has long been upheld as a principle, and that this highlights the 
importance of considering context in research into SDM. Indeed, as Rapley (2008b) has 
argued, ideas about ‘good participation’ are deeply situated in the task at hand, the activity 
and the ceremonial order of that discipline. It follows from this argument that in order to 
examine SDM in a meaningful way, any method used has to be able to take account of these 
factors in analysis.  
 
Collins et al’s analysis of Shared Decision Making from a CA perspective also highlights the 
importance of external contextual factors; noting that the ‘unilateral’ approach they identify 
tends to be more common in an oncology setting, they suggest this may be underpinned by a 
sense of urgency and a limited time span in which to make a decision. We observe here that 
antenatal screening also offers a very limited time span for decisions, and for subsequent 
termination of pregnancy, so it is interesting to reflect on the comparative scarcity of the 
traditionally described unilateral approach in our data
5
. Instead, it seems that the ethos of 
non-directiveness prevails over clinical urgency, with the result that women are left to make 
their own decisions. Whilst the routine and widespread adopting of deontic authority by 
professionals would likely be seen as ethically problematic in this setting, what also happens 
here is that the epistemic resources that professionals have (in relation to testing processes, 
outcomes etc) get sidelined. This results in a kind of vicious circle; that professionals have 
this knowledge by virtue of being professionals, but also by virtue of being professionals they 
decline to use it to impact on decision making. Shared decision making generally assumes a 
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bidirectional dialogue about action/treatment ( Peek et al 2010), and it is generally assumed 
that it is the patient’s perspective that is missing from this dialogue, but in this setting 
professionals do elicit this perspective but then decline to engage with it. Here, then, 
decisions are not so much shared by doctors as devolved to pregnant women to take 
unilaterally, and on the evidence presented in this paper this autonomy of choice, and the 
associated authority to determine future action, may be experienced as a burden rather than a 
means of empowerment. 
 
These findings also have resonance for debates around the notion of consumerist medicine, 
generally taken to mean a scenario in which medical care or treatment is seen as a commodity 
to be freely chosen by individuals. It could be argued that the majority of the consultations 
here would fall into this categorisation, by virtue of the fact that decisions are devolved by 
doctors for patient choice. As Fotaki (2014) has argued in this journal, consumerist models of 
medicine are based on the economic premise of rational individuals who, given the necessary 
information, will make a rational decision to maximise their welfare. However, as she goes 
on to note, and as we have described here, an inherent imbalance of knowledge between 
professionals and clients means that trust in a doctor’s judgement may not easily or 
straightforwardly be replaced by choice. 
 
Such conclusions leave a larger question unanswered: what are the resulting implications for 
practice, and for the debate over what constitutes successful application of SDM? Again, we 
emphasise the importance of context. As Seale et al (2006) have asserted, it is erroneous to 
assume that the only rival to SDM is outmoded paternalism; instead there needs to be a 
recognition that no one model of practice can fit all settings. This is echoed in the work of 
Frank et al (2010), who suggest we will make little progress in researching how treatment 
decisions might best be shared between practitioners and patients until we recognise that this 
is a distributed process which can be affected by multiple other mediators beyond client 
participation, including policies, protocols and the use of technologies. We argue, then, that 
rather than assuming that Shared Decision Making can be assessed as something that does or 
does not take place, it might be better conceptualised as a continuum, with an acceptance that 
different healthcare contexts may require practitioners to adopt a different position on this 
continuum. To inform this debate, further investigation into the way in which SDM intersects 
with wider contextual parameters- including non-directiveness- is needed. 
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Notes: 
1. The combined test uses a combination of ultrasound scan and maternal blood test, and 
is carried out at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy (around 10-13 weeks). The  
integrated test is carried out slightly later (usually around week 16) and assesses 
screening markers from both the first and second trimester of pregnancy. It is more 
effective in avoiding ‘false negative’ results (where cases of Down’s Syndrome are 
not identified) as well as ‘false positive’ results. 
2. Edwards’ syndrome, otherwise known as Trisomy 18, is a serious genetic condition 
caused by an additional copy of chromosome 18. Most babies with this form will die 
before infancy. The vast majority of cases are initially picked up through ultrasound 
examination, though serum screening tests can also give an indication of risk. 
However, amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling is necessary to definitively 
confirm a diagnosis. 
3. For a more detailed consideration of the ways in which risk is presented in this 
setting, and how professionals ‘make meaning’ from these numerical figures for 
pregnant women, see Pilnick and Zayts 2014. 
4. See Zayts and Pilnick 2014 for a discussion of an example in which a woman very 
explicitly asks for guidance in making a decision, but where this guidance is not 
forthcoming. 
5. In the clinic which the data presented here are taken, approximately 59% of women 
immediately opt to undergo amniocentesis or CVS, approximately 34% make an 
immediate decision not to pursue any invasive testing, and the remaining 7% defer 
decision making to a later date. 
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